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Abstract  
  
This study aimed to test two new, simplified tasks related to the eye-test, targeting children 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and typically developing controls (TD). Test-1 
assessed the recognition of emotion/mental states with displays using one word and two eye-
pictures, whereas Test-2 presented displays using two words and one eye-picture. Black and 
white photographs of children were used as materials.  A cross-cultural study 
(Caucasian/East-Asian) with adults was initially carried out to verify generalizability across 
different ethnic groups. Cross-sectional trajectory analyses were used to compare emotion 
recognition from the eyes in the two tests. Trajectories were constructed linking performance 
on both tests either to chronological age or to different measures of mental age (receptive 
vocabulary based on the BPVS, CARS or ASQ for the ASD group). Performance improved 
with chronological age in both the ASD and TD groups of children. However, performance in 
Test-1 was significantly superior in children with ASD, who showed delayed onset and 
slower rate of improvement than TD children in Test-2. In both the ASD and TD groups the 
lowest error rate was recorded for the item ‘anger’, suggesting that threat-detection cue 
mechanisms may be intact in Autism. In general, all children showed good performance on 
our novel tests, thus making them good candidates for assessing younger children and those 
with lower general abilities. 
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 “Her complexion varied with every emotion of her soul, and her eyes, the heralds of her 
speech, now beamed with understanding and now glistened with sensibility” 
(Mullan, THE 7 June 2012 - Cecilia character in Fanny Burney’s novels, 1782) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the work of Premack and Woodruff (1979), research on “mind-reading” abilities has 
expanded into numerous areas of neuroscience and psychology.  Mind-reading refers here to 
the propensity to conceptualize and predict the behavior of others in terms of motivational 
states, thoughts and beliefs, e.g., “the little girl is skipping down the road because she thinks 
the ice-cream van is there and she wants an ice-cream”. Development of such abilities 
emphasizes the separability of mind-reading skills from other cognitive factors (Leslie, 1987). 
Some evidence comes from studies of high-functioning individuals with autism who failed 
simple false-belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg 
& Cohen, 1993; Kaland, Callesen, Møller-Nielsen, Lykke Mortensen & Smith, 2008), while 
passing logically-equivalent tasks not involving the thoughts/mental states of another 
(Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992).  Subsequent research has acknowledged that many 
individuals with autism, and those with other conditions such as traumatic brain injury 
(Apperly, Samson, Chaivarino, Bickerton & Humphrey, 2007; Happe, Malhi & Checkley, 
2001), schizophrenia (Lee, Farrow, Spence & Woodruff, 2004), sometimes focal epilepsy 
(Farrant, Morris, Russell, Elwes, Akanuma, Alarcon & Koutroumanidis, 2005), appear to be 
impaired on mind-reading abilities, albeit not completely lacking the capacity to interpret the 
behavior of others with respect to desires and beliefs.  
 
Despite the complexity of mind-reading behavior, in terms of interpreting subtle non-verbal 
cues and integrating contextual information, finding a way of assessing such abilities to yield 
consistent findings in both clinical and non-clinical populations has remained surprisingly 
elusive (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). While recent work has gone some way to address this 
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gap with a revised “reading the mind in films” task for adults and children (Golan et al., 
2006), as well as the earlier revised child “Emotion in the Eyes task”, no study has yet charted 
the developmental trajectory of this ability using a child-friendly task in both young children 
with ASD and typically developing children (TD).  
 
The present study thus aims to fill this gap by providing a novel and simpler emotion-in-the-
eyes-reading task suitable for very young children and for those with limited vocabulary. 
 
ASD is a common neurodevelopmental syndrome with a strong genetic basis (Abrahams & 
Geschwind, 2008), characterised by two core components:  social interaction/communication 
impairments and stereotypic behaviours. However, there are marked differences in the extent 
and quality of the symptoms found in individuals with ASD.  However, one of the most 
common features of ASD is their striking difficulties with social skills such as understanding 
emotions and the mental states of others (Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
 
Amongst the more salient impairments for ASD in the social communication arena is the 
failure to process information from the faces of others such as facial expression, eye gaze and 
facial recognition which play a significant role in social cognition (Hadjikhani, Joseph, 
Snyder, Chabris, Clark et al., 2004; Pellicano, Jeffery, Burr and Rhodes, 2007; 
Ramachandran, Mitchell & Ropar, 2010). A number of studies have reported that children 
with ASD show greater attention to the mouth rather than to the eye region (e.g., Annaz, 
Karmiloff-Smith, Johnson, & Thomas, 2009; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, &Cohen, 2002; 
Riby, Doherty-Sneddon, & Bruce, 2009). Furthermore, compared to typical controls, 
individuals with ASD show reduced looking times to people, and to faces in particular, in 
both static and dynamic social scenes (e.g., Annaz, et al. 2010, 2012; Klin, et al., 2002; Riby 
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& Hancock, 2008). Several functional imaging studies report atypical or weak activation of 
the fusiform gyrus in ASD, an area that is activated during face recognition in typical 
individuals (Dalton et al., 2005; Schultz et al., 2000), perhaps related to atypical scanning 
pathways or reduced attention to the eyes (Dalton et al., 2005).  
 
Individuals with ASD have also been shown to lack the ability to mentalize and gain social 
insight into the goals and intentions of other people’s behaviours (Castelli, Frith, Happé, & 
Frith, 2002; Hamilton, 2009). Children with ASD experience difficulties with false-belief 
tasks, pretend play and representing other people’s mental states (Hamilton, 2009) while they 
also show impaired empathizing skills on both cognitive (recognizing other people’s mental 
states) and affective levels (emotion reaction deciphered from the person’s mental states) 
(Baron-Cohen, Golan, & Ashwin, 2009). For instance, lower performance on the “Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes Test” (the Eyes Test henceforth) developed by Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1997) and later revised (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill & Lawson, 2001; 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) has been linked to theory of mind 
(ToM) or “mentalizing” deficits. This test is thought to reflect the ability of participants to 
demonstrate their “mentalizing” abilities, i.e., their understanding of another person’s mental 
states such as their emotions, thoughts, desires, beliefs, goals and how they might influence 
their behaviour (Peterson, & Slaughter, 2009). Hence, the Eyes Test appeared to be tapping 
into a well-known deficit in ASD. 
 
However, several limitations of the Eyes Test require attention. First, the test uses posed 
facial expression of emotions thereby lacking a genuine and naturalistic setting (Johnston, 
Miles & McKinlay, 2008). Second, initial validation of the task was based on the poorer 
scores obtained from high-functioning individuals with Autism or Asperger syndrome relative 
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to matched controls (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997, Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), a result which has 
been generally replicated (Back, Ropar & Mitchell, 2007). However, it did not cover children 
with more severe expression of autistic traits. Third, it assumed quite a good level of literacy, 
advanced vocabulary, and reading skills, since it included low frequency words such as 
“incredulous” and “dispirited” (Peterson & Slaughter, 2009). A child version of the Eyes Test 
was subsequently devised by Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Scahill, Spong, and Lawson 
(2001), using somewhat simpler words. However, children were still shown four written 
words stimuli (one target word and three foils), resulting in a considerable cognitive load to 
retain in memory and calling on good literacy skills (the need to read, for example, words like 
“surprised”, “joking”, “sure about something” and “happy” - p.45). Peterson and Slaughter 
(2009) modified this test to a “simplified eye-reading” task (SERT) to make it suitable for 
children who have not yet learned to read yet, albeit conserving its ability to assess ToM 
through observing people’s thoughts and feelings by looking at their eyes. Johnston et al. 
(2008) have also pointed out a number of methodological factors limiting the reliability of the 
Eyes Test, such as the posed vs. genuine emotion, quality of the images (orientation etc.), lack 
of control on the four words used in the test (target vs. foils). Finally, there is still a surprising 
lack of data examining children with lower functioning autism, although these individuals 
form around 70% of the total diagnosed with ASD (Baird, Simonoff, Pickles, Chandler, 
Loucas, Meldrum & Charman, 2006).  
 
The materials developed for the Eyes Test of the present study were derived from naturalistic 
pictures of children (rather than adults) and included reduced cognitive demands by showing 
children only two eye-pictures with one word (Test-1) or one eye-picture with two words 
(Test-2). Since all our participants came from a cosmopolitan multi-ethnic environment, a 
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cross-cultural study (Caucasian/East-Asian) with adults was initially carried out to verify 
generalizability across different ethnic groups. 
 
The aim of the current study was twofold: [1] to investigate performance in children with 
ASD and TD controls on emotion recognition derived from the eye-region of a face; and [2] 
to compare the ASD and TD groups’ performance trajectories on two different tasks (Test-1 
and Test-2), with one task relying on language less than the other (Test-1). Based on results 
from previous research and our current test modifications, we predicted that primary emotions 
would be easier to distinguish than mental states and that children with more advanced 
languages skills (based on their BPVS scores) would show better performance on the tests, 
particularly with respect to Test-2 (one eye-picture, two words). Comparison of the two tests 
will also inform us as to whether the difficulty of the task for children with ASD is more 
likely due to their difficulty in processing facial emotions (particularly from the eye region – 
e.g., Klin et al., 2002) or to accessing emotionally-loaded linguistic information (e.g., Tager-
Flusberg & Joseph, 2005).  
 
2. METHOD 
2.1 Generalisation of the experimental task 
The materials were tested cross-culturally (Caucasian/East-Asian) in order to assess 
generalisation and level of difficulty of the test.  As the data for the main study were collected 
in a multi-ethnic city, it was important to control for possible same-race biases, without 
increasing the number of items (e.g., representing various ethnicities) or confounding emotion 
and ethnicity in the materials for the developmental samples. One cross-cultural comparison 
was conducted. Forty university students (50% female), including 20 British participants 
(tested in London UK, from a similar multi-ethnic background as the child samples) and 20 
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Japanese participants (tested in Kyoto), took part. The test display included one picture of the 
eye-region and two words (one for the target emotion or mental state, one foil) against a dark 
background (see 2.3). 
 
Displays contained black and white photos of Caucasian children’s eye region, portraying 
either mental states or primary emotions. Care was taken to use facial displays that were 
upright and frontal (± 15o from midline). Type of expression and valence were controlled 
across the stimuli, including four items in each category for primary emotions and mental 
states respectively, with two neutral/positive and two negative valence expressions in each 
category. The selection of expressions was chosen following a detailed review of the 
literature, which indicated young children’s knowledge of terms referring to emotions or 
mental states (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1995, 1999; Jenkins & Astington, 1996, 2000). The 
expressions included as primary emotions were happy and surprised (positive/neutral 
valence), and sad and angry (negative valence), while excited and thinking (positive/neutral 
valence), and worried and shy (negative valence) were selected to represent mental states. 
Although in most cases it is unknown what the child was actually feeling at the time of taking 
the photographs, they were all derived from naturalistic settings (e.g., taken by parents) rather 
than being posed specifically for an experiment.  
 
For the test, 56 slides were prepared with each of the eight above-described target 
emotion/mental states paired with each of the seven remaining emotion/mental states in the 
Caucasian series – see Appendix 1. The displays were randomized across participants and the 
positioning of words within the displays (aligned with left/right bottom edge of the picture) 
was counterbalanced to avoid spatial bias. In the cross-cultural preliminary study, the 56 
Caucasian slides were used, with the addition of an equivalent set of 56 black and white 
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photos of East-Asian children with the same characteristics and covering the same primary 
emotion/mental state x valence design, yielding a total of 112 displays. Target emotions/states 
were produced by different children in each ethnic group. Displays with the stimuli were 
presented as PowerPoint slides on a PC laptop with 15” screen, and accuracy scores were 
recorded.  
 
Participants were tested individually and asked to indicate verbally which word would best 
describe the picture presented on each slide. They first had two practice trials in which the 
experimenter provided feedback on their accuracy. Since each target emotion/mental state 
was paired with each of the remaining emotion/mental state as foils (i.e., seven times – see 
Appendix 1), the accuracy score could range from 0 (never identified correctly) to 7 (always 
identified correctly) in each sub-set (Western vs. East-Asian). Testing lasted approximately 
15 minutes. 
 
A minimum 70% correct score was set for an individual stimulus to be included in the 
materials. In order to obtain generalization baselines, Positive/Neutral Primary Emotion, 
Negative Primary Emotion, Positive/Neutral Mental State, and Negative Mental State scores 
were computed by averaging scores from items of the same type (e.g., ‘happy’ and ‘excited’) 
- see Table 1.  All accuracy scores generated for the above categories were ≥ .70 (5/7 items) 
for all categories, with most being ≥ .85 (6/7 items) for both Western and East-Asian groups1. 
 Thus, the materials used in the newly developed tasks did not produce the other race effect 
which could have impacted on reliable identification of facial expressions investigated in this 
                                                 
1 A 2 (cultures) x 2 (ethnicities) item analysis was performed for each individual item. The culture x ethnicity 
interaction was never significant, with p >.05 before correcting for multiple comparisons in all ANOVAs. The 
only exception was ‘thinking’, in which the interaction was F(1,38)=7.46, p = .009, due to slightly higher 
identification scores achieved for the ‘other’ race: Japanese > British participants on Caucasian eyes (6.8 and 
6.05, respectively) but British > Japanese participants on East-Asian eyes (6.3 and 6.1, respectively). In sum, the 
only exception was in the opposite direction with respect to the ‘same race bias’ prediction. 
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study. In other words, these results do not support the hypothesis that a same-race bias (Kelly, 
Liu, Rodger, Miellet, Ge & Caldara, 2011; Vizioli, Rousselet &  Caldara, 2010) may 
confound the results with our multi-ethnic developmental samples, using the same materials.  
 
 
 
2.2 ASD group 
Twenty-two children with ASD (20 males, 2 females), and 62 TD control children (28 males, 
29 females) participated in the current study. The gender bias for the ASD group was 
characteristic of the disorder (Baird et al., 2006). Two of the participants with ASD were 
excluded due to their extremely high BPVS scores and CARS scores within the normal values 
(outliers), and five TD children were excluded from the data analysis due to experimental 
error. The final sample included 20 children with ASD and 57 TD children. Children in the 
TD group had no known developmental disorder or other medical conditions. Participant 
characteristics provided in Table 2. Both ASD and TD samples were multi-ethnic and 
attended publicly-funded schools across London, UK. 
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The age range and large group size of the TD children permitted comparisons to be made 
between disorder and TD trajectories, either on the basis of chronological age (CA) or on the 
basis of verbal mental age (MA), where the ASD group may have lower mental ages. 
Children in the ASD group met established criteria for ASD, such as those specified in the 
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and ADOS (Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule) (Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, & Risi, 1999). Verbal mental age was 
assessed with the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS II) (Dunn et al., 1996). Children in 
the ASD group were also assessed on the Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS)(Schopler 
et al., 1993) and ASQ (Autism Screener Questionnaire) (Berument, Rutter, Lord, Pickles & 
Bailey, 1999), in order to provide additional screening. Table 2 provides group details, 
confirming that children with ASD in this sample scored above the cut-off for ASD.  
 
Children in the ASD group were recruited from specialist schools for children with ASD, 
support groups for parents and after-school clubs for children with ASD. TD control children 
were recruited from nurseries, schools and play schemes. All individuals in both groups had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of the children had any co-morbid medical or 
psychiatric disorders, noted from the children’s records or, if missing, from oral interview 
with the parents. All the children had English as their first language.  
 
The Psychology Ethics Committee at Middlesex University approved the experimental 
protocol prior to the recruitment of participants. Both parental informed consent and the 
child’s assent were obtained before participation. 
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2.3 Design and Materials 
Two tasks were used: Test-1 included two photos of the eye-region with one word between 
them (one picture for the target emotion or mental state described by the word and one foil), 
against a dark background (Figure 1A). In Test-2, one picture with two words underneath was 
presented (one for the target emotion or mental state and one foil), also against a dark 
background (Figure 1B), as used in the validation study. Primary emotions were contrasted to 
mental states with either positive/neutral or negative valence. 
 
For each test, 56 slides were prepared with each target emotion/mental state paired with each 
of the remaining emotion/mental states (see 2.1 and Appendix 1). Both Test-1 and Test-2 
displays were randomized across participants. Positioning of pictures/words within the 
displays was fully counterbalanced, and every target primary emotion/mental state was paired 
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with each of the seven remaining items. Accuracy scores ranged from 0 - never identified 
correctly, to 7 - always identified correctly. 
 
 
 
2.4 Apparatus  
Slides with sets of stimuli for Tests 1 and 2 were presented on a PC laptop with a 15” screen 
via SuperLab software.  
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2.5 Procedure 
Each child was individually tested in a quiet place. The experimenter was already familiar 
with all the children with ASD, and care was taken to allow for some familiarization time also 
with the TD participants. First, participants were administered the BPVS. There was a break 
of about five minutes between the completion of the BPVS and the start of Tests 1 or 2. All 
the children took part in both Tests 1 and 2, with the order of the test presentation being 
randomized across participants and allowing for a minimum gap of half an hour between the 
two testing sessions. Prior to the first experimental testing, each child was seated in front of 
the computer, at a comfortable distance (approximately 40 cm from the screen), and took part 
in a practice trial. For Test-1, participants were asked to look at the pictures of children (two 
displays, one with the target picture on top and one with the target picture at the bottom of the 
slide) and asked to indicate which one best matched the word presented along with the 
pictures (e.g., “Look, there is a sad child here. Can you tell me which one is the sad child?”). 
A similar procedure was applied for Test 2: two displays were used for practice, one with 
target word on the left and the other with target word on the right edge of the slide. 
Participants were asked to indicate which word best described the picture presented (e.g., 
“Look at this child – is this child happy or sad?”). In both tests, children were given feedback 
on accuracy during the practice trials.  
 
The experimenter coded children’s choices by key-press, specifying the left/right word or 
top/bottom picture in each slide; these responses were subsequently transformed into 
correct/incorrect matches with respect to the target emotion/mental state. For each test, the 
testing session took approximately 10 minutes. Children were monitored for tiredness, and 
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were provided with stickers as rewards during the breaks. For some children, it was necessary 
to have a short extra break due to a decrease in attention. 
  
3. RESULTS 
 
3.1 Background measures 
There was no difference between the groups on the BPVS raw scores; F(2,2.47) = 29.6, p = 
0.1442. Due to the exploratory nature of the test and flexible use of multiple comparisons to 
the TD data-points, the developmental trajectories method was employed.  A fully factorial 
ANCOVA was used with MA (based on verbal BPVS scores) and CA as the covariates and 
task transformation (two words / one picture or one word / two pictures) as within-participant 
factors (see Thomas, Annaz, Ansari, Scerif, Jarrold, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2009, for more 
details of the developmental trajectory method). Test performance was analysed for each 
group separately, and then the ASD group was compared to the TD group, by adding a 
between-participant factor of group to the design. In addition, we performed two planned 
comparisons. These were: (i) to assess each group’s performance on individual 
emotion/mental types (Test 1 and Test 2 respectively), (ii) to compare performance on Test-1 
and Test-2 for each group, and (iii) compare error types for each group. The overall results are 
displayed in Table 3 (expressed as percentage performance correct for ease of 
comprehension).  
 
 
                                                 
2 Welsh ANOVA was used since the homogeneity of variances assumption was violated. 
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3.2 TEST 1 (TWO PICTURES AND ONE WORD) 
3.2.1 TD group 
Performance scores improved reliably with mental ages using BPVS scores: happy/surprised  
(F(1,55) = 11.28, p < .001, ηp
2 = .17); sad/angry (F(1,55) = 9.40, p = .003, ηp2 = .14), and 
mental states: excited/thinking (F(1,55) = 10.4, p = .002, ηp2 = .16), worried/shy (F(1,55) = 
17.30, p < .001, ηp
2 = .24). Similar performance was observed when performance scores were 
linked to CA on primary emotions: happy/surprised  (F(1,55) = 19.3, p < .001, ηp2 = .26); 
sad/angry (F(1,55) = 19.6, p < .001, ηp2 = .26) and mental states: excited/thinking (F(1,55) = 
18.1, p < .001, ηp2 = .25), worried/shy (F(1,55) = 21.2, p < .001, ηp2 = .28).  
 
3.2.2. ASD group 
Performance scores on the test plotted against the BPVS scores did not improve on 
happy/surprised trials (F(1,18) = 1.5, p = .23, ηp2 = .10) and mental states: excited/thinking 
(F(1,18) = .38, p = .54, ηp2 = .10), worried/shy  (F(1,18) = .95, p = .34, ηp2 = .10). The only 
improvement in performance was seen on sad/angry trials (F(1,18) = 6.4, p = .02, ηp2 = .26). 
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In contrast, performance scores improved reliably with CA on all primary emotions: 
happy/surprised trials (F(1,18) = 6.9, p = .017, ηp2 = .30), sad/angry trials (F(1,18) = 16.7, p = 
.001, ηp2 = .48), and mental states: excited/thinking (F(1,18) = 7.7, p = .012, ηp2 = .30) and 
worried/shy  (F(1,18) = 6.3, p = .022, ηp2 = .26). Lastly, performance scores plotted against 
the CARS and ASQ also did not serve as better predictors of performance than CA. 
 
3.2.3 Comparison of ASD to TD group 
Children in the ASD group showed a delayed onset and slower rate of improvement with CA 
on: happy/surprised  (group: F(1,77) = 6.2, p = .015, ηp2 = .10; group x age: F(1,77) = 9.2, p = 
.003, ηp
2 = .11) and worried/shy (group: F(1,77) = 4.8, p = .032, ηp2 = .10; group x age: 
F(1,77) = 6.2, p = .015, ηp2 = .10). However, this was not the case for sad/angry (group: 
F(1,77) = 1.3, p = .26, ηp
2 = .024, group x age: F(1,77) = 1.3, p = .257, ηp2 = .10), and 
excited/thinking (group: F(1,77) = 1.3, p = .26, ηp2 = .02; group x age: F(1,77) = 1.0, p =  .317, 
ηp
2 = .10) where the ASD group showed a similar onset and rate of performance increase on 
the tasks as the TD group. 
 
3.3 TEST 2 (ONE PICTURE AND TWO WORDS) 
3.3.1. TD group 
In TD children, performance scores improved reliably with mental age (based on BPVS 
scores) on all primary emotions: happy/surprised  (F(1,55) = 25.8, p < .001, ηp2 = .32); 
sad/angry (F(1,55) = 11.3, p < .004, ηp2 = .17), and mental states: excited/thinking (F(1,55) = 
10.4, p = .002, ηp2 = .16), worried/shy (F(1,55) = 18.9, p < .001, ηp2 = .26). Similar 
performance was achieved when examining performance scores with CA: happy/surprised  
(F(1,55) = 26.6, p < .001, ηp2 = .33); sad/angry (F(1,55) = 9.1, p < .004, ηp2 = .14), and mental 
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states: excited/thinking (F(1,55) = 12.1, p < .001, ηp2 = .18), worried/shy (F(1,55) = 13.1, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .19).  
 
3.3.2. ASD group 
Performance scores of the ASD group improved reliably with CA only on excited/thinking 
trials (F(1,18) = 7.7, p = .013, ηp2 = .30). Also when accuracy scores were linked to MA 
(based on BPVS scores), CARS and ASQ respectively to ascertain whether these would serve 
to normalise the disorder trajectories, none of them turned out to be significant (all p > .1). 
 
3.3.3. Comparison of TD vs. ASD performance  
Children in the ASD group were less accurate compared to the TD group on the primary 
emotions: happy/surprised  (group: F(1,77) = 5.14, p = .034, ηp2 = .11); sad/angry (group: 
F(1,77) = 4.01, p = .028, ηp2 = .13). Also, the ASD group had a much slower rate of 
improvement on mental states: excited/thinking (effect of group x age: F(1,77) = 4.90, p = 
.030, ηp2 = .06), worried/shy (effect of group x age: F(1,77) = 4.45, p = .038, ηp2 = .057). 
 
 
3.4. COMPARISON OF TEST-1 AND TEST-2 
When we compared performance of each group on Tests 1 and 2, children in the TD group 
did not show any differences in performance on the positive emotion recognition trials (all 
p>.1). In contrast, children in the ASD group showed better performance on positive emotions 
on the Test-1 (main effect of test: F(1,17) = 4.25, p = .05) increasing with CA (test x CA: 
F(1,17) = 5.43, p = .03) but not with MA (p >.1). A similar outcome emerged for the primary 
negative emotion trials with no difference in performance between the tests for the TD group 
(all p>.1).  Children in the ASD group achieved marginally better scores on Test-1 (main 
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effect of test: F(1,17)= 3.82, p= .067) which was modulated by CA (interaction of test x CA: 
F(1,17)= 6.01, p= .025). For the positive mental states recognition, both groups showed no 
difference in performance scores between the Tests 1 and 2 (all p>.1) On the negative mental 
states recognition, only children with ASD achieved marginally better scores on Test-1 (main 
effect of test: F(1,17)= 3.92, p= .065) which was modulated by CA (interaction of test x CA: 
F(1,17)= 5.31, p= .034). Figure 2 summarises the findings. 
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Lastly, since there was an even split of gender in the TD group, each variable was also co-
varied with gender. There were no differences between TD boys and girls on the tests (p >.1).  
 
3.5. ANALYSIS OF ERRORS  
In order to gain an insight into the kind of errors committed by children, we conducted an 
exploratory item analysis - see Table 4. Binomial tests were computed on each item within 
Tests 1 and 2 separately, assessing the distribution of incorrect responses – all tests were 
significant at p ≤ .0001, indicating that both groups performed well above chance level. 
Remarkably, the negative primary emotion of anger was associated with the lowest 
proportion of errors in both groups of children and in both tests. As we have seen from the 
quantitative analyses presented in the previous section, mental states were associated with 
higher proportions of errors. In Test-1, both groups had the highest error rate on ‘shy’ 
(negative/mental state), while in Test-2 the highest error rate was seen on ‘worry’ in the ADS 
group and ‘excited’ in the TD group. 
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Finally, when considering the nature of confusions (see Appendix 2), the younger TD 
children appeared to mistake ‘surprised’ and ‘shy’ for a variety of other displays, while ‘sad’ 
was only confused with ‘worried’ (and vice versa), ‘excited’ mostly with positive primary 
emotions, and ‘think’ equally between ‘sad’, ‘worried’ and ‘shy’, with the distribution of 
errors presenting less dispersion across categories in Test-2 than in Test-1. The TD children at 
the end tail of the developmental trajectory presented a much more specific confusion matrix, 
with less difference between Tests 1 and 2. For example, ‘excited’ was mistaken for ‘happy’ 
and vice versa, ‘sad’ with ‘worried’ and vice versa, and ‘shy’ with ‘worried’.  They thus 
tended to make mistakes mostly within affect valence. In contrast, children with ASD made 
mistakes across both types of state and valence; for example, ‘surprised’ was confused with 
‘worried’ and ‘sad’, ‘thinking’ with ‘worried’ and ‘shy’, and ‘shy’ mostly with ‘angry’ and 
‘thinking’ (see also Brennand, Schepman & Rodway, 2011).  
 
4. DISCUSSION 
Understanding emotions is one of the most important abilities for social interaction and 
human survival. Mixed findings regarding this ability in autism have resulted in a heated 
debate.  In the current study, we examined the performance of children with ASD and TD 
control children on newly-developed emotion recognition tasks targeting the eye-region and 
using real children’s naturally occurring emotions on faces and materials tested cross-
culturally.  Overall, our results show above-chance correct emotion/mental state match to the 
eye-pictures in both groups of children. Thus, the simplification of the Eyes Test was 
successful in facilitating performance in children with ASD from a younger age range than 
hitherto found in the majority of the studies in this field. As most emotion research has so far 
been carried out with high-functioning individuals with ASD and little with children from a 
wide range of ASD features, and as performance on our new tasks was similar across the 
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individuals with ASD, the results demonstrate that the simplified tasks created for the present 
study are suitable for individuals with lower-functioning autism, a rather neglected group of 
individuals on the spectrum. Although no gender effects were found in the present study, 
future developments of our methodology would benefit from using gender-matched samples.  
 
Chronological age proved to be, in general, the most sensitive predictor of developmental 
trends, with CARS and ASQ scores failing to modulate any performance outcomes in the 
ASD group in any of the tasks. Thus, length of experience in a social milieu appears to be 
specifically associated with improved performance, consistent with what has been found in 
earlier studies (e.g., Annaz et al., 2009).  
 
Based on previous research and current test modifications, we predicted that primary 
emotions will be easier to distinguish than mental states, and that children with more 
advanced languages skills (based on BPVS scores) would show better performance on the 
tests, particularly on Test-2 (one eye-picture, two words). As predicted, children in the ASD 
group showed better performance on Test-1, which was less cognitively demanding because it 
accessed mainly the visual domain and required less semantic processing. However, it should 
be noted that the ASD group was delayed but not impaired in their performance on Test-2, 
which is likely to be due to their difficulty in accessing emotionally-loaded linguistic 
information (e.g., Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2005).  
 
Thus, the type of test significantly differentiated between the two groups (TD/ASD), with 
Test-1 (two pictures/one word) being associated with developmental progression in both 
groups when considering CA, but Test-2 failing to reveal developmental progression in the 
ASD group. Indeed, performance was similar across the two tests for the TD children but was 
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significantly better in Test-1 than in Test-2 for the ASD group. However, when comparing 
directly TD and ASD groups in Test-1, children with ASD presented delayed onset and 
slower rate of improvement than TD children on a subset of states (positive/neutral primary 
emotions: happy/surprised, and negative mental states: (worried/shy). 
 
The two tests were designed to tap into different cognitive demands, presenting the 
emotion/state forced choice either visually (as in ‘face in the crowd’ experiments, e.g., 
LoBue, 2009) or verbally (as in the classic Eyes Tests, e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) thereby 
allowing us to examine language vs. face processing deficits across the two tests. Given the 
worse performance of children with ASD on Test-2 (one eye-picture, two words), the results 
support the view that language deficits in the ASD group may well be responsible for lower 
performance or delayed onset and slower improvement with respect to TD children in the eye-
test type of tasks (e.g., Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2005). 
 
However, it is also possible that the kind of visual processing elicited in the two tests was 
qualitatively different. In Test-1 (visual forced choice), children were asked to match a target 
emotion/state word to one of two eye-pictures. In other words, once the word was understood, 
the child had to recognise the eye-picture corresponding to the semantic content verbally 
accessed (rapid recognition of a pattern of features). However, in Test-2 (verbal forced 
choice), not only did children have to process two verbal labels rather than one, but they also 
needed to inspect the eye-picture in order to select the word corresponding to the 
emotion/state visually depicted. In other words, they needed to understand the eye-picture in 
order to decide whether it represented state A or B. It appears therefore that Test-2 may 
require visual concentration on a region of the face that is known to be the least spontaneously 
looked at by individuals with ASD (reduced looking time at people and faces: Annaz, et al., 
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2010; Klin, et al., 2003; Riby & Hancock, 2008), and presented in a version (direct gaze) for 
which several recent studies have highlighted atypical neural responses already in infancy in 
the ASD phenotype (Elsabbagh et al., 2009, 2012; Senju & Johnson, 2009). 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the highest accuracy score in both ASD and TD groups was for 
the primary emotion of anger. It might simply be that anger is expressed more strongly or 
more unambiguously in the eye region than some of the other emotions tested in the present 
study. However, a predisposition to detect anger has been previously reported in Asperger 
Syndrome (Ashwin, Wheelwright, & Baron- Cohen, 2006) and in adults with ASD (Krysko & 
Rutherford, 2009). Results with adolescents with ASD yield inconsistent outcomes: Rosset et 
al. (2001) found an anger superiority effect in a ‘face in the crowd’ experiment but Farran, 
Branson & King (2011) failed to replicate such findings. The inconsistency was possibly due 
to the different types of materials used: drawings in Rosset et al. (2001) and real faces in 
Farran et al. (2011).  Our results show that by using simplified tasks with real photos 
displaying natural rather than posed emotions, even younger children including individuals 
with lower functioning autism show biased sensitivity to the detection of threat-related cues. 
Even more importantly, such cues are recognized in our tasks from the eye-region only and in 
real (not schematic) peer faces. This bias may be explained by the high evolutionary value of 
recognizing anger in others which could be directed to the perceiver. This original bias may 
be strengthened or attenuated by other factors, such as experience or phenotype. When 
considering a particular type of experience, for example, Camras, Ribordy, Hill, and Martino 
(1990) and Pollak, Cicchetti, Hornung and Reed (2000) showed that maltreated children 
tended to perform better than controls in the recognition of anger in masked expressions of 
emotion, whereas adults with social anxiety disorder performed significantly less well than 
controls in the recognition of facial expressions of anger (Montagne , Schutters, Westenberg, 
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Van Honk, Kessels & De Haan, 2006). Difference in RTs between women (faster) and men 
was found to be largest for facial expressions of anger in a study by Hampson, van Anders 
and Mullin (2006). More importantly, Ackerman et al. (2006) found that, particularly in 
conditions in which cognitive resources are limited, the typical in-group homogeneity effect 
for face recognition was reversed for angry faces: effective self-protection induces sensitivity 
to facial signals that may be particularly relevant for the perceiver’s functional outcomes (Fox 
et al., 2000; Maner et al., 2003; Ohman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001; see Schupp et al., 2004 for 
ERP evidence).  Facilitation in detecting anger over other emotions has been shown also in 5-
year-old TD children (LoBue, 2009) but not in children with Williams Syndrome (Santos, 
Silva, Rosset & Deruelle, 2010), consistently with their profile that includes decreased 
sensitivity to social threat. Thus, the results from our study contribute to qualify the ASD 
profile at younger ages and including lower levels of functioning as displaying an 
intact/typical ability to process threat-related cues even when they are detected in conditions 
which are not favourable considering known impairments associated with ASD (see above: 
face/ eye-region and direct gaze). It is thus possible to speculate that, due to their evolutionary 
survival importance, threat-related cues are accessible to individuals with ASD in spite of 
documented hypoactivation of the amygdala and its direct modulatory role on the fusiform 
face area (FFA)  (Schultz, 2005). 
 
Research examining the understanding of emotional recognition in children with low 
functioning autism is scant despite the fact that they form over of 70% of those on the autism 
spectrum (Baird, Simonoff, Pickles, Chandler, Loucas, Meldrum, & Charman, 2006; see also 
Kent, Carrington, Le Couteur, Gould, Wing, Maljaars, Noens, van Berckelaer-Onnes & 
Leekam, 2013). The novel tasks developed to test children from a wide range of abilities may 
contribute to gaining further understanding of all children on the spectrum, rather than merely 
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the high-functioning ones.  Our approach may also help to develop and optimise support 
materials and training strategies for educational settings in which children with social 
difficulties are identified.  
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Appendix 1. 
Description of experiment materials: 56 slides, each containing one target and one foil 
emotion/state. 
 
 
 
 
56 SLIDES 
FOILS 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
TA
R
G
ET
 
1. Happy surprised sad angry excited thinking worried shy 
 
2. Surprised happy sad angry excited thinking worried shy 
 
3. Sad happy surprised angry excited thinking worried shy 
 
4. Angry happy surprised sad excited thinking worried shy 
 
5. Excited happy surprised sad angry thinking worried shy 
 
6. Thinking happy surprised sad angry excited worried shy 
 
7. Worried happy surprised sad angry excited thinking shy 
 
8. Shy happy surprised sad angry excited thinking worried 
 
 Appendix 2. 
 
TEST 1 - Confusion matrix TD vs. ASD group (% of total errors) 
 
  TARGET EMOTION TARGET MENTAL STATE 
   
   
   
 R
ES
PO
N
SE
 
 HAPPY SURPRISE SAD ANGRY THINK EXCITED WORRRIED SHY 
 TD ASD TD ASD TD ASD TD ASD TD ASD TD ASD TD ASD TD ASD 
HAP -- -- 20.6 17.6 7.04 9.5 11.1 0 15.1 12 36.5 44 4.6 0 16.9 12.5 
SURP 10.8 12.5 -- -- 7.04 14.3 11.1 33.3 13.9 12 16.3 16 7.7 26.7 9.3 6.25 
SAD 13.5 0 13.04 11.8 -- -- 16.7 0 19.8 16 10.6 4 35.4 20 15.2 18.75 
ANG 5.4 0 1.1 0 9.9 4.8 -- -- 4.6 0 2.9 8 9.2 20 9.3 9.4 
THIN 18.9 37.5 18.5 17.6 9.9 19.04 5.55 66.6 -- -- 10.6 20 13.8 6.7 16.1 25 
EXC 29.7 50.0 16.3 29.4 5.63 14.3 11.1 0 16.3 8 -- -- 7.7 13.3 11.02 9.4 
WOR 10.8 0 18.5 23.5 40.8 28.6 16.7 0 16.3 28 11.5 4 -- -- 22.03 18.75 
SHY 10.8 0 11.96 0 15.5 9.5 27.8 0 13.9 24 11.5 4 21.5 13.3 -- -- 
 
TEST 2 - Confusion matrix TD vs. ASD group (% of total errors) 
 
 TARGET EMOTION TARGET MENTAL STATE 
R
ES
PO
N
SE
 
 HAPPY SURPRISE SAD ANGRY THINK EXCITED WORRRIED SHY 
 TD ASD TD ASD TD ASD TD ASD TD ASD TD ASD TD ASD TD ASD 
HAP -- -- 4.2 0 4.5 0 8.7 25 8.43 4.8 30.5 34.8 7.3 6.9 10.2 0 
SURP 10.3 13.3 -- -- 12.5 15 8.7 0 14.4 4.8 18.1 21.7 12.2 6.9 14.3 12 
SAD 4.4 6.7 10.6 21.05 -- -- 4.3 12.5 10.8 9.5 4.8 8.7 23.2 27.6 10.2 8 
ANG 7.3 6.7 4.2 0 11.4 5 -- -- 12.04 9.5 6.7 8.7 9.8 6.9 9.2 36 
THIN 14.7 0 22.3 15.8 18.2 20 4.3 12.5 -- -- 17.1 4.3 15.8 20.7 12.2 24 
EXC 33.8 46.7 9.6 15.8 4.5 5 2.17 37.5 14.45 9.5 -- -- 0 6.9 31.6 12 
WOR 13.2 13.3 27.6 26.3 27.3 25 26.1 25 16.86 9.5 11.4 13.04 -- -- 12.2 8 
SHY 16.2 13.3 21.3 21.05 21.6 30 26.1 0 22.89 52.4 11.4 8.7 24.4 24.1 -- -- 
 
